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Julie Cohen has made extraordinarily illuminating contributions to the field
of law and technology. In CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF,
she articulates a compelling normative framework for her earlier
interventions. Her method is eclectic, situated, and particularist. She
adopts no sweeping philosophical desiderata to unify her treatment of
intellectual property online. Nor do economic measures of efficiency and
utility motivate the project.
Cohen’s CONFIGURING is instead a book that takes online subjectivity
and community seriously, in both its established and emergent forms. It
cautions against either public or private entities trying too hard to monitor
and control information flows online. It does so not in the name of fairness,
welfare, utility, or deontology, but in the name of play—or, more
expansively, recognizing the value of intrinsically worthwhile, “pursuedfor-their-own sake” activities on the net. Grounded in cultural theory and
thick descriptions of life online, Cohen’s work should lead thinkers within
law—and well outside it—to reconsider how they think about critical
problems in the design and regulation of technology.
To demonstrate this, I’m going to focus less on how CONFIGURING
should affect others’ thought, and more on how it changed how I think
about digital copyright infringement. In past work, I’ve endorsed legal
reform that is broadly in the mainstream of technocratic meliorism, 1
including a proposal to tax broadband to compensate artists based on their
popularity.
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Those who take CONFIGURING seriously can’t endorse such a proposal
without more adequately acknowledging its “costs.” Moreover, Cohen
shows us why the term “costs” deserves scare quotes. Influenced by her, I
use it here only in the broadest sense of “negative effects,” and not to claim
the patina of quantified rationality enjoyed by cost-benefit analysis.
My review focuses first on the practical implications of CONFIGURING,
then addresses Cohen’s methodology. A cautionary note: CONFIGURING
is an extraordinarily rich, dense book. Rather than merely applying extant
cultural theory to law, Cohen tends to distill it into her own distinctive
social theory of the information age. Thus, even relatively short sections of
chapters of her book often merit article-length close readings, optimally
done by a reader far better schooled in social theory than me. What I can
offer here is a brief for the practical importance of Cohen’s theory, and
ways it should influence Internet policy and scholarship.
As Cohen shows in her discussion of “the emergence of architectures of
control,” both government and corporate efforts to manage computers and
the Internet have a long history. The 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
criminalized “unauthorized access” to “protected” computer systems. In the
1990s, a series of changes in copyright law parried the impact of new
technologies of reproduction and distribution of works. Worries over
cybersecurity, industrial espionage, and pornography also shaped legislative
battles and law enforcement decisions.
By the late 1990s, the Internet appeared to be at a crossroads, drifting either
toward either “info-anarchy” or “perfect control.” Just as the major record
labels seemed to have secured an impregnable oligopoly, services like
Napster disrupted their (and many other content owners’) control over
works. “File sharing” provoked new technology and law designed to
control users’ activity. Cohen wrote a series of articles at the time
critiquing misguided initiatives and proposing technology and law that
would give users some assurance that rights they traditionally enjoyed in the
analog world would endure as more works went digital. 2
Then, as now, there has been a divide between an academic community
deeply committed to promoting user rights, and the content managers who
aspire to monetize works. Some academics proposed a middle ground,
designed to separate the issue of control from compensation. In the past,
when Congress realized that new technology would lead to widespread
copying, it often imposed a small fee per copy—a practice known as
compulsory licensing. This regime, still in place for many works, could
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perhaps be applied to digital copying, assuring some payment to artists and
distributors without trampling free speech and a thriving remix culture. 3
The recording industry itself has repeatedly (and successfully) lobbied to
force composers and lyricists to accept a governmentally set compulsory
license; turnabout is fair play.
Some say that the compulsory licensing regime can’t work in the Wild West
of untrammeled Internet distribution. But Terry Fisher has offered a
detailed proposal in PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT. 4 The Fisher plan would subsidize
culture by lightly taxing the communication networks that enable its
uncompensated duplication, and distributing the proceeds to artists based on
how often their works are accessed and viewed.
I have endorsed proposals like Fisher’s in the past. And yet, looking at
them from the perspective of Cohen’s “networked self,” I grow more
skeptical. To work well, the new compulsory licensing must rely on
pervasive surveillance of what is being listened to and watched. If purely
based on “number of downloads” or “number of views”, it would provoke
extensive gaming. We’ve already seen scandals concerning artists who
allegedly manipulated their YouTube view count (either to gain more ad
revenue, or to appear more popular than they actually were). Such gaming
will in turn provoke countermeasures—monitoring who is viewing and
liking what. Do we really want some central authority to collect all this
information, merely in order to ensure that Lady Gaga gets, say, 100 times
more revenue than Lana del Ray? 5
After reading Cohen’s work, it’s hard not to see technocratic plans for
allocating entertainment industry revenue as an instance of “modulation,”
an effort to monitor and exercise soft control over certain communities
(here, artists). We should reconsider the plasticity of institutions like
compulsory license fees. Maybe there should be minimum compensation,
to assure some degree of security to all artists (WPA 2.0?), and maximum
gains, to discourage gaming at the high end? Perhaps the aspiration to
precisely calibrate reward to “value,” as measured by the number of times
something is viewed or watched, fails on its own economic terms: a
particularly effective film may do its “work” in one sitting. 6 Or someone
might reasonably value one experience of a particularly transcendent song
over 100 plays of background music.
The larger point here is that there is not just a tension between the play of
creativity and the copyright maximalism of dominant industry players.
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Even the most progressive reform proposals can unintentionally warp
creative endeavors in one way or another. The legal establishment has more
often than not tried to wall out these considerations: “we’ll worry about the
law and the money, and let the artists themselves figure out the creative
angle.” But, as Cohen shows, the experience of play and creativity are at
the core of the enterprise—they shouldn’t be treated as “add-ons” or
independent of legal deliberations. We can’t get cultural policy right if we
fail to consider what better and worse modes of artistic creation are on the
terms of creators themselves.
What if it turns out that properly calibrating risk and reward is a nearimpossible task for law? I’m reminded of the insights of John Kay’s
OBLIQUITY: WHY OUR GOALS ARE BEST ACHIEVED
INDIRECTLY, 7 and in that spirit, let me make a side observation on the
way to my point. At least in my experience, the best way of predicting
whether someone would pursue a career in the arts was a wealthy spouse or
family. The word is out: it’s simply too risky to try and make a living as a
painter, musician, actor, or poet—particularly given constant pressure for
cuts to welfare benefits, food stamps, and Medicaid in the United States.
But in other countries, where the social safety net is more generous, the
possibility of failure is not so bone-chilling. Consider the fate of J.K.
Rowling, who hit “rock bottom” (in her words) while writing, and had to
rely on Britain’s benefits system. 8 A few years of support allowed her to
get a foothold in the literary profession—and without it, Harry Potter might
never have been written. The implementation of the Affordable Care Act in
2014 is one bright spot for the marginally employed in the United States.
Perhaps we’ll find, decades hence, that the biggest impetus to artistic
careers (and independent employment of all kind) was guaranteed issue of
health insurance policies via state exchanges, and subsidies to purchase
them. Perhaps the health policy experts will do more to advance creativity
than all the copyright policymakers combined, simply by assuring some
breathing room for the (hopefully, temporary) failures of those in creative
industries.
These reflections may not gather much of a following in an academy that
prizes methodological rigor and citation counts over whimsy and the
acknowledgement of contingency. But the academy’s own disciplines and
forms of problem definition can obscure as much as they clarify. 9 Their
appeal can be more rhetorical than substantive. As Cohen has stated:
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[T]he purported advantage of rights theories and economic
theories is neither precisely that they are normative nor
precisely that they are scientific, but that they do normative
work in a scientific way. Their normative heft derives from a
small number of formal principles and purports to concern
questions that are a step or two removed from the particular
question of policy to be decided . . . . These theories manifest
a quasi-scientific neutrality as to copyright law that consists
precisely in the high degree of abstraction with which they
facilitate thinking about processes of cultural transmission.10
Cohen notes many “scholars’ aversion to the complexities of cultural
theory, which persistently violates those principles.” 11 But she feels they
should embrace it, given that it offers “account[s] of the nature and
development of knowledge that [are] both far more robust and far more
nuanced than anything that liberal political philosophy has to offer . . . .
[particularly in understanding] how existing knowledge systems have
evolved, and how they are encoded and enforced.” 12
A term like “knowledge system” may itself seem very abstract, and far from
the urgency of contemporary debates about privacy or intellectual property.
But its very open-endedness and capaciousness is precisely what is needed
as technology advances and leaves us in an increasingly “weightless”
economy and society. As more economic value is located in software
systems, “big data”, pattern recognition, and the “lords of the cloud” with
privileged access to all these processes, we ought to feel more free to
reimagine the terms of social cooperation—not less. These systems are in
principle more plastic than the industrial economy they are supplanting—
but may well end up being less easy to influence to reflect public values. 13
Notably, Cohen evokes imagination in two of her chapter titles—
“Imagining the Networked Information Society” and “Reimagining
Privacy.” 14 The value of her emphasis on particularism—and the cultural
theory such close reading of actual practice supports—lies precisely in its
ability to catalyze creative thought about social arrangements, fueled by
attention to actually existing cultures and creativity and discretion. Like the
“constructed commons” project of Madison, Strandburg, & Frischmann,
Cohen’s work points to experiments in information sharing (and protecting)
that need to be preserved against standardization according to monolithic
economic or philosophical models.
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Inspired by Cohen’s work, we may well be able to get beyond the usual
antinomy of information as “end product” (which justifies a high purchase
price) vs. “input” (which is used as a justification for policies that set a zero
or low price on content, like fair use or compulsory licensing). Cohen’s
work insists on a capacious view of network-enabled forms of knowing.
Rather than naturalizing and accepting as given the limits of copyright law
on the dissemination of knowledge, she can subsume them into a much
broader framework of understanding where “knowing” is going. That
framework includes cultural practices, norms, economics, and bureaucratic
processes, as well as law.
We’ve seen that kind of ambition before, in Lawrence Lessig’s CODE:
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE. 15 But Cohen is not willing to
accept its pathbreaking “modalities” approach to the shaping and control of
human action. 16 As stated in Chapter 7 of CONFIGURING:
The four-part framework [of Lessig’s CODE] cannot take us
where we need to go. An account of regulation emerging
from the Newtonian interaction of code, law, market, and
norms [i.e., culture] is far too simple regarding both
instrumentalities and effects. The architectures of control
now coalescing around issues of copyright and security
signal systemic realignments in the ordering of vast sectors
of activity both inside and outside markets, in response to
asserted needs that are both economic and societal. 17
What is happening beyond the CODE framework? Aside from the
theoretical rationales Cohen givens, historical developments motivate a
move beyond Lessig’s pre-millennial framework.
The Internet is in many ways centralizing power. 18 But life online runs the
gamut from frivolity to high public purpose. 19 As Ethan Zukerman
observes, these high and low aims can be mutually reinforcing. 20 A video
like “Collateral Murder” can be spliced into MIA’s “Vicki Leekz”
mixtape. 21 A Twitter community formed around cricket may turn to
political activism, and vice versa. 22 As images, music, and words get
recopied, repurposed, and remixed, symbolic orders emerge undisciplined
by the usual triple authority of church, state, and home.
As legal scholars, we’re conditioned to jump to the normative questions
immediately, asking “is this a good thing?” It’s tempting to flee to free
speech-fundamentalism (“promiscuous publication and zero privacy, uber
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alles!”) or control fetishism (“lock down and propertize!”) in order to
respond decisively to fast-paced events. 23 Cohen insists that before we take
any normative stance toward the blooming, buzzing confusion of Internet
life, we had better understand it. Cultural theory is above all specific—to
time, place, and people grappling with situated struggles.
Reading Cohen’s book, I was reminded of classic debates about the role of
social science, philosophy, and values in law. As David Kennedy and
William W. Fisher III have observed,
Law students struggle to understand the relationship between
“the rules” and the vague arguments that lawyers call
“policy.” Should “policy” begin only in the exception—
when legal deduction runs out—or should it be a routine part
of legal analysis? If the latter, how should lawyers reason
about policy? What should go into reasoning about
“policy”—how much ethics, how much empiricism, how
much economics? Which of the arguments laypeople use
count as professionally acceptable arguments of “policy” and
which do not? Which mark one as naïve, an outsider to the
professional consensus? What is it about policy argument
that makes it seem more professional, more analytical, more
persuasive, than talking about “mere politics”? 24
Cohen cleared the ground for CONFIGURING in earlier works like
Lochner in Cyberspace and Copyright and the Perfect Curve. 25 In those
articles, she explored how ostensibly neutral and objective philosophic and
economic approaches failed to rise above “mere politics” in many contexts.
Combining her analytic critique with the narrative of legislative history in
Jessica Litman’s DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, 26 one is hard-pressed to interpret
modern copyright policy as much more than a messy compromise between
the commercial interests of massive communications, content, and Internet
firms. That law has created a set of baseline expectations that is hard to
rationalize on either economic or philosophic grounds. Moreover, efforts to
justify small departures from it on such grounds miss a greater and more
necessary subject of critique and reconsideration: namely, the larger
information system that intellectual property and surveillance laws are
underwriting.
As more traditional scholars battle over whether Comcast’s property and
free speech rights should trump those of their customers, 27 Cohen suggests a
more open-ended approach. How invasive is the deep packet inspection
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that an Internet Service Provider like Comcast proposes? Who gets to
monitor its monitoring? Why is it performing this surveillance? Are
financial criminals as likely to be targeted as, say, copyright infringers? 28
Who gets the data? What type of activity will be chilled by this
intervention? Can users opt out, or is the fused public and private power
here for all intents and purposes monopolistic? As she notes, “[s]ome
information policy problems cannot be solved simply by prescribing greater
‘openness’ or more ‘neutrality:’”
[R]ights of access to information and information networks
do not necessarily correlate with rights to privacy; indeed,
they more typically function in the opposite way. As network
users become habituated to trading information for
information and other services, access to goods and services
takes place in an environment characterized by increasing
amounts of both transparency and exposure . . . . [H]uman
flourishing in the networked information society requires
additional structural safeguards.
....
. . . . The lives of situated subjects are increasingly shaped
by decisions made and implemented using networked
information technologies. Those decisions present some
possibilities and foreclose others. Most people have very
little understanding of the ways that such decisions are made
or of the options that are not presented. In many cases, this
facial inaccessibility is reinforced by regimes of secrecy that
limit even technically trained outsiders to “black box”
testing. We would not tolerate comparable restrictions on
access to the basic laws of physics, chemistry, or biology,
which govern the operation of the physical environment.
The algorithms and protocols that sort and categorize
situated subjects, shape information flows, and authorize or
deny access to network resources are the basic operational
laws of the emerging networked information society; to
exercise meaningful control over their surroundings, people
need access to a baseline level of information about what
those algorithms and protocols do. 29
Trying to theorize rights and utility claims in the absence of such
information may be an exercise in futility. We can’t grasp the landscape
without a map.
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A short review can only scratch the surface of Cohen’s contributions in this
book. So far, I’ve barely mentioned the type of selfhood her work aims to
support. CONFIGURING’s construction of the “networked self” is deeply
insightful, and deserves at least some comment.
There is a lucky class of people who live to work, but most tend to work in
order to live. 30 The point of life is in non-work—time to spend with family
and friends, enjoy culture (low, high, and in between), to reconnect with the
ultimate sources of value and meaning, and to communicate about all of
this. This balance of work and leisure, or instrumentally rational action and
value-driven action, is a theme of political economy. In a field preoccupied
with the fair allocation of rewards from work(s) of various kinds, Cohen
emphasizes the “play” of culture, subjectivity, and material practice in
respective parts of her book. 31 She helps us understand that “play” isn’t just
something that happens on the edges of a life well lived—it’s often the
point.
Cohen’s work on play fills in a concept simultaneously hypostatized by
natural law theory (Finnis calls play one of the seven basic human goods),
and too often left under-explained within it. As Cohen shows, play is
indeed capacious, ranging from remixes of music videos and punning on
Twitter to the “freedom to tinker” with devices and undisturbed exploration
of alternate points of view (or even alternate selves). Considering some of
the edgier forms of play, we may well understand why the natural law
theorists have left it relatively underdeveloped (in comparison with other
basic goods like sociability, religion, life, and aesthetic experience).
Moreover, one person’s play can be another’s boring chore (I remember
how enthusiastic I was as a kid to play Monopoly, and how my poor
overworked father recoiled, in mock horror, from another round of
“Monotony”). Play can be paradoxical, creating (within its general aura of
rest and Csikmenthalyian flow) spaces of reward and frustration,
achievement and stigma. But those alternate spaces are (supposed to be a)
refuge from the daily grind of getting and spending, control and submission,
that are characteristic of our more hierarchically ordered economy and
politics.
Space for play and leisure has been politically contested. Patterns of rest
and work considered perfectly acceptable under feudalism had to be altered
dramatically by capitalist enterprise. Workers fought back over decades,
demanding limits on the workweek and certain basic rights. And that
revolution has in turn inspired a counterrevolution in our time, promoted by
both neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. 32 Under neoliberalism, the
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sphere of play must either contract or bear profit. Under post-9/11
neoconservativism, there is an increasing emphasis on surveillance of all
aspects of life, leaving little room for the unsupervised, unmonitored
encounters vital to certain forms of intersubjectivity and self-expression. 33
Leading neoliberals and neoconservatives employ the rhetoric of emergency
to announce “there is no alternative” to the social arrangements that their
theories, in truth, merely recommend. 34 Our social networks do not need to
be fonts of advertising revenue; our artists should not need to shake down
every would-be fan. At least in the developed world, there is ample social
surplus to support these are far more creative endeavors. 35 Nor does the
“terrorist threat” merit the level of surveillance or policing now targeted at
political activists, copyright infringers, and travelers. The economic
pressure of austerity and the political movement for absolute “security” are
in this sense “play emergencies” in the pejorative sense of play: performed,
pretended, miniature. 36 The men behind the curtains of banks and law
enforcement agencies ominously warn of horrible consequences should they
not get their way. In response, we must question: when is the cure of
control worse than the diseases of disorder it promises to eliminate? When
is “disorder” really an unrecognized, spontaneous order, worth preserving
rather than taming and transforming?
Cohen’s book will not give us definitive answers to these questions. But in
forcing us to consider them, it substantially broadens the horizon of inquiry
in what are classically considered “intellectual property and privacy”
disputes. While narrow specialists in each field tend to develop tunnel
vision, the lived experience of Internet users inevitably discloses their
intertwining (with every EULA clicked, or ad served, or warning given
about the consequences of infringement and industry and government’s
ability to watch it). 37 Powerful trends would ever more tightly restrict
individual access to content, and ever expand the ability of various
authorities to monitor that access. Cohen’s work forces us to reconsider
those social forces in light a true “play emergency”—the declining number
of free, unmonitored, unmonetized opportunities ordinary people have to
pursue creative expression, cooperation, and consumption. Preserving and
expanding those spaces is as worthy a vocation as promoting economic
efficiency or defending rights.
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